History of the Wayne Mayhew Company: Part I -- Cost Programs by Mayhew, Wayne E.
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Touche Ross Publications Deloitte Collection
1962
History of the Wayne Mayhew Company: Part I --
Cost Programs
Wayne E. Mayhew
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_tr
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touche Ross
Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Quarterly, Vol. 08, no. 3 (1962, September), p. 14-28
His tory of the "Wayne Mayhem 
By Wayne E. Mayhew, £ 
-TTLFTER HIS GRADUATION from Brigham Young University in 1923, 
the author worked as a junior accountant for a small firm of certified 
public accountants in Salt Lake City, and in 1925 began a practice for 
himself in Ogden, Utah. This practice was continued until he moved 
to California in 1936. During the first few years in California he was 
a partner in (1) Timpson & Mayhew, (2) Timpson, Mayhew & Briss-
man, and (3) Mayhew & Brissman & Co. Mr. Brissman retired in 
1942 and the firm name was changed to Wayne Mayhew & Company 
in 1943, which name was continued until the merger with Touche, 
Ross, Bailey & Smart in 1954. 
The Move to California — Specialization 
Specialization in the field of food processing began in Utah in the 
early 1930's. There were about a dozen small vegetable canners in 
Utah; by 1933 nearly all of them were audit clients. The first cost ac-
counting manual was prepared in 1933 under title "Simplified Cost 
Accounting for Canners." In the light of current cost finding tech-
niques this 73-page manual is, of course, obsolete; but the classification 
of accounts, the functional grouping, and the format for product line 
operating statements have changed very little. The primary objective 
then, as now, was to furnish management with reliable and compre-
hensive accounting information regarding operating results. 
Because of the very limited opportunities in Utah, and because of 
an intense desire to specialize in this field, the Ogden practice was sold 
to a Salt Lake City firm. All bridges were burned and the move was 
made to California, which was and is the home of the largest segment 
of the canning industry in the world. Paul Warnick was employed by 
the firm in Utah in 1935. He remained in Utah for a time after the 
sale in 1936 to help transfer the clientele to the purchasing firm. Then 
he moved to California early in 1937 and became a partner in 1942. 
Dale Bowen also joined the staff in California in 1937 and became a 
partner in 1949. Both of these men grew up with the firm in Cali-
fornia, and were co-founders of the specialized practice in food proc-
essing. They became partners in Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart at the 
time of the merger in 1954. 
Two Areas of Specialization 
From the very beginning of the practice in California the firm 
specialized in two quite different and distinct areas: (1) in food proc-
essing and (2) farmers' cooperative marketing associations. In the 
beginning food processing was limited to canners, but the practice 
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was eventually extended to include freezers, dehydrators, dried fruit 
packers, and others. The farmers' marketing association cut across 
industry lines and included canners, dried fruit packers, wineries, 
creameries, fresh produce shippers, storage and marketing associa-
tions for rice, beans, clover seed, etc. California leads all other states 
in the number and dollar volume of farmers' marketing associations. 
This article will be concerned mainly with the area of food processing. 
Specialization in the food processing field is based on a unique 
system of unit cost findings, first developed in California, and later ex-
tended to other segments of the food industry. The essential features 
of the Mayhew system itself will be explained later. The firm soon 
gained a reputation as auditors and cost accountants — cost account-
ing led to auditing and vice versa. While auditing eventually produced 
about 75% of the fees, it was a fairly common practice to render cost 
accounting services to non-audit clients; many of these companies 
eventually became audit clients. From California the firm extended 
its food processing clientele geographically to the Northwest, to the 
Midwest, and to upper New York State. This expansion meant adapt-
ing the system to a large variety of packaged foods and food processors, 
including canned and frozen fish. It is estimated that more than 200 
food processors are currently using the Mayhew system of cost finding. 
Also, there are now eight different groups of food processors partici-
pating in cooperative cost accounting programs, as follows: (1) Cali-
fornia Canners, (2) California Freezers, (3) California Dehydrators, 
(4) California Olive Canners, (5) Northwest Canners and Freezers, 
(6) Midwest Vegetable Canners, (7) New York State Canners and 
Freezers and (8) Tri-State Canners and Freezers. 
In addition to Paul Warnick and Dale Bowen, who contributed so 
importantly to the development of the firm from its early beginnings in 
California, there are other men who joined the staff later and became 
key members of the personnel. Carl Warnick (brother of Paul) was 
with the firm for more than ten years and was a partner at the time of 
the merger. He is now in practice for himself. Also, Ed Ericksen 
(Portland) and Robert Ludlow (Modesto) were partners for about ten 
years. Ludlow is now in practice for himself, and Ericksen recently 
accepted a position as controller and vice president of Pacific Amer-
ican Fisheries. Gail Brown was also a partner prior to the merger and 
is now a partner in TRB&S in Rochester, where he has developed a 
significant clientele of food processors and farmers cooperatives. 
Wayne Mayhew, Jr., has developed a similar clientele of Midwest 
vegetable canners (Milwaukee Office). Nephi Conrad (supervisor in 
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San Francisco) has been with the firm since the early 1940's except 
for time out for military service. All of these men made important 
contributions in the development of our large clientele of food proc-
essors, before the merger with Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart. 
Our specialization in the field of farmers cooperatives was a natural 
outgrowth of the early experiences of the partners. The author gained 
valuable experience with cooperatives in Utah, where he worked with 
the late Frank Evans, who was for many years very prominently iden-
tified with agriculture at the national level. Evans was a member of 
the Federal Farm Board in the Hoover administration, and later was 
general counsel for the American Farm Bureau Federation. He was a 
dedicated man, a champion of the American farmer, one of the found-
ers of the cooperative movement in the agricultural field in the United 
States. The author had many interesting and stimulating discussions 
with Evans during the time he was writing the first book published on 
cooperative law entitled "The Law of Agricultural Cooperative Mar-
keting." This was after Evans had retired from the national scene, 
and had returned to Utah to practice law and to specialize in the 
cooperative field. 
Both of the other partners, L. S. Timpson and Herman G. Briss-
man, had a number of small cooperative clients. Also, the first and 
only job that Paul Warnick had after his graduation from college and 
before joining the firm was office manager and accountant for a 
farmers' cooperative in Utah. In those days there were few public 
accountants who had a comprehensive understanding of the account-
ing problems for cooperatives. The most important of these problems 
involved taxes and tax exemption. They were exempt only if they 
actually did not earn a profit for themselves; but this basic principle 
did not seem to be properly understood, and many of them attempted 
to have their cake and eat it too. Whether they were actually exempt 
depended on their legal structure, their operating policies, and their 
accounting practices. There was also the important problem of a 
proper and equitable accounting by pools, representing crop years 
and/or products. Closely related was the problem of an equitable 
accounting to the individual grower participants in these pools. The 
firm soon gained a reputation for its helpfulness in solving these prob-
lems. The Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives was itself in the process of 
formulating its policies and practices; they helped us and we helped 
them. This gave us an enviable opportunity and reputation in the 
field, which has continued until the present time. We presently have a 
large clientele consisting of more than 40 farmers marketing coopera-
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tives, a number of them with annual sales from 50 to 100 million dol-
lars. Shortly before the merger into Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart, 
Paul Warnick began to assume full responsibility in this area. He su-
pervises the audits, attends membership meetings, board meetings, and 
renders many other constructive services at the management level. He 
is a recognized authority in this field. The firm also has a number of 
these cooperative clients which are serviced by the Portland Office 
and the Rochester Office. 
The California Canning Industry and 
The Canners Industry Board 
The California Canning Industry suffered a severe depression which 
began with the 1937 pack year. There had been a light crop of Yellow 
Cling Peaches in 1936 which resulted in high prices for the finished 
product. In 1937 the canners bid the price of peaches to about $45.00 
per ton which compared with about $25.00 for a number of prior 
years. There was also a very large pack in 1937, which resulted in 
low selling prices. The combination of high prices for the raw prod-
uct and low prices for the finished product combined to bankrupt some 
of the canners. Some of them were reorganized and many of them sur-
vived by obtaining loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion, a government lending agency that had been created in the early 
1930's. 
In an effort to save themselves from bankruptcy, 25 California can-
ners entered into a 3-year agreement which provided for (1) pooling 
the inventory and sales of the 1937 pack of Yellow Cling peaches, (2) 
reporting to a central agency all sales and selling prices for all major 
products, (3) reporting prices paid for the raw product, and (4) 
uniform cost accounting. The pooling of the 1937 pack applied only 
to Y.C. peaches, but all the other services applied to all principal 
varieties, and covered a period of three years. In order to carry out 
the terms of this 3-year agreement, a staff was employed and an office 
was set up under the name "Canners Industry Board" (C.I.B.). The 
large advertised-brand companies and a few small independent com-
panies did not participate, and since these non-participants packed 
more than 50% of the total, the C.I.B. agreement was presumed to be 
legal. The agreement preamble also sought legal justification under 
California laws prohibiting the selling of goods below cost. A still 
further justification was that the participants were faced with a life or 
death emergency. 
Shortly after this agreement was terminated according to its own 
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terms, a suit was filed against all California canners, both participants 
and nonparticipants, claiming that there was a price fixing conspiracy 
to violate U. S. antitrust laws. This suit was aimed primarily at the 
pooling of sales of the 1937 crop of Yellow Cling Peaches. For this 
reason, the signatory canners pleaded nolo contendere and paid fines 
totaling more than $100,000.00. The nonparticipating canners de-
fended themselves in the U. S. 9th Circuit Court, and won their case 
in what was, at that time, the longest antitrust trial in the history of 
the Court. 
This brief history of the C.I.B. is important because it was during 
this three-year period that the Mayhew system was developed and the 
first cost program organized. The short clause in agreement conveyed 
a rather nebulous and vague idea that somehow a uniform system of 
cost accounting would be a good thing for the industry. Nothing was 
said as to how it was to be carried out, nor what system was to be 
used. A few years before this time, a manual of cost accounting had 
been prepared for California canners by Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Mont-
gomery, with the assistance of an industry committee, the purpose 
being to establish a uniform cost accounting system. While its pur-
pose had not been realized, even to a small degree, it had undoubtedly 
created the interest which resulted in having the basic idea tacked on 
to the end of the C.I.B. agreement, somewhat as an afterthought. The 
author was employed and given the complete and unhampered respon-
sibility of carrying out this part of the agreement. 
During this three-year period the Mayhew system was actually 
adopted and installed by nearly all of the 25 participating companies. 
The cost accounting program evolved during that period was con-
tinued under the sponsorship of the Canners League of California, be-
ginning with the 1940 crop year. Including these first three years, this 
program has been in effect continuously for 25 years; we are now, 
in 1962, in the 26th year of its operation. 
While the government antitrust indictment mentioned cost account-
ing along with everything else "from Adam until the present time" 
it seemed evident, later in the trial, that cost accounting was not ac-
tually under attack. The Canners League of California, upon advice 
of counsel, was willing to sponsor the program as a permanent indus-
try service, beginning in 1940. The question of the legality of these 
cooperative cost accounting programs always arises when an industry 
trade association considers sponsoring such a program. Our firm takes 
the position that such cost programs could be either legal or illegal, 
depending on their nature and purpose, and that all of the programs 
that we service are strictly legal. This is primarily because they do not, 
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to any extent, involve the gathering nor disseminating of statistics re-
garding selling prices. It may be true that industry average cost re-
ports, along with the individual companies' own costs, applied in a 
uniform manner, will indirectly influence general price levels and/or 
prices of individual items; but if they do so it is only because the par-
ticipants have become more intelligent competitors through this very 
useful tool of management. 
Cost Programs and The Mayhew System 
At this point, the term "cost programs" should be briefly defined, 
which can be done by listing the important features that are common 
to all of them: (1) a uniform system of unit cost finding is used to 
determine costs for each participant in the program, (2) the cost ex-
periences of all participants are audited by the firm, and group average 
costs determined. They are then segregated into range groups for the 
high, medium, and low cost participants, (3) reports are then made to 
each participant showing his own cost compared with the group aver-
age (these yardsticks become the most valuable end product of the 
program), (4) for food processors there is also an annual preseason 
cost estimate report, showing the various elements of cost and the 
grand total cost to make and sell each size and grade item. These 
estimates are always based on the prior year's group average cost ex-
perience, after adjusting for all known changes, such as raw product 
prices, labor rates, materials, and other ingredient prices, overhead 
rates, etc. 
The preceding paragraph explains how the cost programs work. It 
will also be desirable to define briefly the essential features of the sys-
tem itself: (1) Each principal element of cost is determined and shown 
separately in the unit cost statement, for each size and grade item 
packed. (2) All elements of cost are included (including indirect 
costs) so that the unit cost statement will show the grand total cost 
to make and sell every item. This is important because management 
wants to see costs compared with selling prices. ^3) The starting point 
for these unit cost computations is the dollar amounts from general 
ledger accounts, so that the unit cost statements will tie in, or auto-
matically balance with the operating and P & L statements. (4) All 
of the allocating and prorating of the elements of cost are made in 
accordance with standardized rules of cost accounting procedure, 
which means uniform cost accounting. (5) All of the allocating and 
prorating to size and grade items is achieved by arithmetical com-
putations, thus reducing record keeping to the minimum requirements 
of a comprehensive double entry bookkeeping system. 
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Still another definition might be helpful. The term uniform cost 
accounting system might mean many things to many people. It has 
been defined in all of the manuals prepared by this author in terms of 
what an industry must do in order to accomplish uniformity. These 
procedures are essentially the same for every segment of the food 
processing industry, and also for other non-food industries: (1) there 
must be a uniform classification of the elements of cost, grouped in 
accordance with natural and logical functions. (2) There must be 
standardized accounting rules for allocating the raw products to the 
end product, which requires a double set of cost allocation factors, 
one of which will represent the quantity required and the other the 
quality of the product used. This always becomes a separate and 
distinct problem for each product. (3) There must be standardized 
rules of accounting for allocating all other major elements of direct 
cost such as labor, ingredients, containers, etc. These rules will usu-
ally be applicable to all products alike. (4) There must be standard-
ized rules for prorating each element of indirect cost (usually a group 
total) to all of the size and grade items produced. These rules will 
necessarily be arbitrary, but when they are adopted and used by a 
substantial industry group, this usage will make them correct. 
How Is Each Element of Cost Allocated? 
The evolution of the use of cost relationship factors for allocating 
each and every element of cost should be explained briefly. Since for 
statistical purposes, packs were already being converted to common 
denominator cases, by the use of quantitative factors, why not use the 
same procedure for each separate element of cost? This would mean, 
of course, a different set of factors for each. For cans, cases, and 
labels, this would be simple because the cost relationship factor could 
be based on the actual cost for each can-size case. For various labor 
steps a cost relationship could be determined by time studies. For in-
direct costs the factors would necessarily be a percentage relationship 
of certain groups of indirect costs to particular direct costs, which was 
a commonly accepted accounting practice. Extending the same reason-
ing to raw product, this could be achieved by using two sets of relation-
ship factors: one to represent the quantity of product going into the 
cans in a case, and the other to represent the differences in the grades 
of the product. 
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Having reached this point in the reasoning process, the remaining 
question was how and where to find these qualitative differentials. 
This was done by making an exhaustive study (a "five-year period) of 
normal selling price differentials for each grade in the same can size. 
The difference in price due to quantity was thus automatically elimi-
nated. After determining normal historical price differentials by 
grades, all other costs except fruit were computed and deducted; the 
remainder represented the relative value of the fruit (including profit) 
by grades. These remaining differences in value were then converted 
to qualitative cost allocation factors. For example, the qualitative 
raw product cost allocation factors for Yellow Cling Peaches devel-
oped in 1938 were as follows: Fancy — 1.30, Choice — 1.15, standard 
— 1.00, seconds and water — .75, pie — .50. Twenty-four years later 
these factors are still being used. Usage by the industry has helped 
to make them correct. They will never need to be changed unless or 
until Mr. and Mrs. Consumer change their tastes, or their relative 
evaluation of these grades. In the 1930's peaches were about $30 to 
$40 per ton, compared with about $65 to $70 today. This means that 
there has been a substantial fanwise spread in the relative grade costs, 
and in the relative selling prices by grades, during the past 25 years. 
Selling price grade differentials, in terms of the amount per case, have 
been automatically inflated, along with the prices themselves. 
I 
How To Determine The Raw Product Cost Per Case for All Sizes 
and Grades of Y.C. Peaches 
The illustrative schedule on the next page will explain the cost 
accounting procedure for determining the raw product cost per case 
for all sizes and grades of Yellow Cling Peaches, by the use of two 
sets of cost allocation factors: (1) quantitative and (2) qualitative. 
In actual practice, about 40 to 50 size and grade items of Yellow 
Cling Peaches might be packed, including the two styles "halves" and 
"sliced." This illustration is simplified by using only 10 items of 
"halves." The greater the number of items, the more simple and 
time-saving this procedure becomes, keeping in mind that the same 
technique is also used for determining all other elements of cost for 
each of the size and grade items. Only one conversion work sheet is 
necessary for each product packed. 
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COMPUTATION OF RAW PRODUCT COST - Y. C. PEACHES 
Size and Grade 
Description 
Choice 
Choice 
Choice 
Standard 
Standard 
Standard 
Water 
Wafer 
Pie — Regular 
Pie — Sol id Pack 
Total 
Total tons used 
(STEP 
2 4 / 2 - % 
4 8 / 8 o r . 
6 / 1 0 
2 4 / 2 - % 
303 
6 / 1 0 
2 4 / 2 - V2 
6 / 1 0 
6 / 1 0 
6 / 1 0 
Cases per ton {case y ie ld — basis 24 
N O . 1) 
Cases 
Packed 
240,300 
56,610 
39,460 
26,120 
10,405 
30,550 
4,670 
3,690 
4,430 
6,140 
391,375 
/ 2 - % ) 
Quantity 
Factor 
1.00 
.60 
.91 
1.00 
.56 
.91 
1.00 
.91 
.91 
1.50 
Conver ted 
Cases 
240,300 
15,366 
35,908 
26,120 
5,827 
27,800 
4,670 
3,358 
4,031 
9,210 
Svb-
Total 
291,574 
59,747 
8,028 
13,241 
372,590 
6,824 
54.6 
COST PER CASE - BY GRADES 
Grade 
Choice 
Standard 
Water 
Pie 
Total 
Paid growers 
Hau l ing and other costs 
Total 
(STEP 
Cases 
Packed 
291,574 
59,747 
8,024 
13,241 
372,586 
N O . 2) 
fac to r 
Quality 
1.15 
1.00 
.75 
.50 
Per Ton 
$55.30 
18.75 
$74.05 
Conver ted 
Cases 
335,310 
59,747 
6,021 
6,620 
407,698 
(STEP N O . 4) 
Cosf per Case 
Size 24/2 - '/2 
$1.4253 
1.2394 
.9296 
.6197 
Amount 
$377,367.20 
127,950.00 
$505,317.20 
COST PER BASIC CASES - 24/? - Vi STANDARD 
(STEP NO. 3) 
See above - $505,317.20 -*- 407,698 = $1.2394 
Grade yield: 407,698 H- 372,586 = 109.4 
Summarizing the step-by-step procedure illustrated at left for Yel-
low Cling Peaches (1) convert the quantities packed to basic cases 
using quantitative factors. (2) Convert the quantitative cases to the 
final equivalent cases, using qualitative factors. (3) Divide the dollar 
amount of cost by the equivalent cases to determine the cost for the 
basic case, which is 24 cans of size 2Vi standard peaches. (4) Mul-
tiply the cost per basic case by the qualitative factor to determine the 
cost per case for each grade of the basic can size, and (5) not shown 
in the illustrative schedule above is the last and final step: To deter-
mine the cost of any other can size, multiply the cost of the grade by 
the proper can size factor. For example, the cost for a case of Choice 
Peaches - containing 48/8 oz. cans will be $1.4253 x .60 = $.85518. 
The author's first manual illustrating these unit cost finding pro-
cedures was published in 1940 under the title Canners Industry Board 
— Cost Accounting Manual. In 1953, a revised edition was published 
under the title May hew Manual of Cost Accounting for Fruit and 
Vegetable Canners. The last edition was published in 1960 under the 
same title. It is designed to cover the essential procedures and tech-
niques for all fruits and vegetables, and illustrates them in detail for 
only spinach, corn, green beans, and freestone peaches. For a more 
detailed exposition of the technical procedures described above, refer 
to the Mayhew manual which also includes illustrations of the end 
product, which is the unit cost statement itself. For canners these pro-
cedures have been adapted to more than 20 fruit and vegetable prod-
ucts; for freezers they have been adapted to nearly all of the same 
products, plus some others that are frozen only. As previously stated, 
they are now used by more than 200 canners, freezers, dehydrators 
and other food processors throughout the United States. 
Cost Accounting and Wartime Price Controls 
A history of Wayne Mayhew & Co. would be incomplete without 
a brief story of the part this firm played as advisors to canners in 
connection with Government ceiling prices during both World War II 
. and the Korean conflict. During both of these periods all processed 
foods were under price control. The Governmental Agency during 
World War II was the Office of Price Administration (O.P.A.) and 
during the Korean War it was the Office of Price Stabilization 
(O.P.S.). While there was an intervening period, the problems were 
the same, quite a number of the key personnel in the agencies were 
the same, and many of the mistakes made by the O.P.A. were repeated 
by the O.P.S. 
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The Government recruited some of its key administrative personnel 
from the canning industry; many of them were men of ability and in-
tegrity, but few of them stayed more than a few months to a year. 
Also, at the administrative level (price executives) were many young 
lawyers and economists with little or no knowledge of the industry; 
many of them were not only impractical but definitely anti-business. 
There was also quite a number of Government career economists, 
transferred from other Government agencies, particularly the U. S. 
Department of Agriculture. At the lower levels of responsibility, the 
Government staff men were recruited mostly from the ranks of the un-
employed, and many of them were very incompetent, to say the least. 
Long-Drawn-Out and Sometimes Bitter Skirmishes 
On the industry side of these long-drawn-out and sometimes bitter 
skirmishes were principally topflight food company executives from 
both large and small companies. The problems were so urgent and 
the stakes so great that they sometimes went to Washington in droves. 
It was not uncommon for a large group of industry representatives 
to meet with pricing officials daily for three to six weeks. The results 
were often similar to what usually happens at sessions of the United 
Nations. Canning company groups did not take legal counsel with 
them, but many of them did employ legal advisors in Washington. 
Some of these industries attorneys were employees of the O.P.A. or 
the O.P.S. Independent auditors or CPA's were almost never a part 
of the industry team in Washington, one of the few exceptions being 
the California (later other groups) industry represented by Wayne 
Mayhew & Company. 
The Government's first action was to freeze the prices of individual 
canners as of a designated 30-day period, presumed to be prior to 
the time when the prices were influenced by the war. These prices 
prevailed until the next packing season. Beginning with the next 
packing season each canner was permitted to compute new ceiling 
prices based on the following formula: (1) Begin with his own 
base period prices. (2) Add permitted increases in cost for (a) 
raw product, (b) direct labor, (c) other direct costs. While this 
formula appeared to be simple, in actual practice it proved to be com-
plex and difficult, particularly for those segments of the industry that 
did not have a uniform system of cost accounting. The California can-
ners were fortunate, unique, and envied by all other canner groups 
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because they not only had a system, but they had factual cost data, 
individually and collectively. This was especially advantageous in 
computing cost increases by grades. Without this standardized pro-
cedure canners were forced to compute such increases without regard 
to grades; i.e., the same increase per case for all grades. This was 
highly important because raw product is always a large part of the cost, 
and during the war the grower prices went up sharply. The Govern-
ment did not actually control grower prices, but the canners' permitted 
cost increases were based on an assumed price per ton. This was a 
form of indirect but usually fairly effective means of controlling 
grower prices. 
The basic formula described above resulted in controversies and 
inequities, primarily because prices were not stable during the base 
period, or because the designated period resulted in a substantial and 
unfair rollback of prices. This made it necessary to permit applica-
tions for individual relief, and other adjustments. The Government 
later attempted so-called "band pricing" for some products, briefly 
described as follows: (1) Start with the computed prices for the prior 
year. (2) Add permitted cost increases. (3) For computed prices 
falling below a designated minimum, adjust to the minimum. (4) For 
computed prices falling above a designated maximum, adjust to the 
maximum. These procedures also proved to be complex and burden-
some and after a year were abandoned. The Government then resorted 
to "flat pricing" for some products: the same price for all canners, for 
each size and grade item. Even this supposedly simple procedure was 
controversial and troublesome because it failed to recognize historical 
differences in prices as betwen canners; particularly as to the adver-
tised brand packers. Furthermore, the regulations did not price all 
items packed, which made it necessary for individual canners to apply 
for a price on specific items, and in doing so he was required to com-
pute the cost of the item by relating it to the cost of the "nearest size 
and grade item." 
The two preceding paragraphs refer very briefly to only a few of 
the many problems encountered, but they will serve to indicate the 
nature of the almost endless controversies between individual can-
ners and the Government, and between industry groups and the Gov-
ernment. Heavy penalties were provided for violations, which tended 
to jam the administrative machinery with relatively minor applications 
for relief. The regulations were numerous, some covering only one or 
two products. Most of them were reissued each year, shifting gears to 
an entirely new approach. All of these regulations were clothed in 
SEPTEMBER 1962 25 
voluminous legal verbiage, which made them seem ominous as well as 
difficult to understand. Government lawyers and economists were in 
particularly bad repute with canners. Many amusing and uncompli-
mentary stories were invented and retold a thousand times. For ex-
ample, "Moses used only 329 words to write the ten commandments, 
but the O.P.S. required 6,759 words to regulate the price of cabbage." 
It will be evident that regardless of the method of controlling prices 
there was a basic underlying assumption that controlled prices must be 
related to costs, and some form of cost computations was necessary 
in every regulation issued. The California canners had their own 
individual costs as well as industry average costs for every major 
product and for most of the can sizes and grades. More important, 
they were using an established system of cost finding. This made it 
comparatively easy for California canners to obtain satisfactory regu-
lations and to compute cost increases whenever necessary. The cost 
data developed by our firm for industry purposes was accepted by 
the Government reluctantly, because we were not recognized by the 
Agency as independent accountants; we were presumed to be biased, 
and our data colored by the fact that we were employed by business. 
This point of view was shared by the agency lawyers and economists 
who in turn were accused by canners of being slightly pink. But both 
Government and the industry agreed that all price regulations should 
be supported by factual cost data. Our costs were accepted only 
because no other data were available. 
Both the O.P.A. and later the O.P.S. had a staff of accountants to 
whom industry costs were submitted for review. Each year this staff 
grew larger until during the last year of O.P.S. it was reputed to have 
more than 100 field auditors with a total annual cost of more than 
$750,000. At the beginning of the year the industry was notified, 
in no uncertain terms, that industry compiled costs would no longer 
be accepted; conclusions were to be based on the findings of their own 
accounting staff. Accordingly, numerous field audits were made, in 
every segment of the industry. This venture proved to be an embar-
rassing failure; it appears that the dollar amounts could not be trans-
lated into unit costs for the numerous size and grade items of each 
product. At the 11th hour, the O.P.S. sent for us and our current 
cost data, so that new price regulations could be issued in time for the 
next packing season. By this time we had developed industry cost 
data for the dried fruit industry and for canners in other areas as well 
as California. It is our considered opinion that there were two principal 
and closely related reasons for this failure on the part of the O.P.S. 
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accounting staff: (1) Most of the staff were inexperienced in cost ac-
counting for food processing or any other kind of cost accounting. 
None of them were CPAs. (2) More important, they either did not 
know or they refused to accept the California canners' technique for 
allocating raw product costs to grades. They shunned us like the 
plague; we were persona non grata to the accounting staff, as well to 
many of the O.P.S. lawyers and economists. However, this attitude 
was always in the nature of an undercurrent; it never came to the 
surface in any unpleasant incidents. 
Our activities during the life of O.P.A. and O.P.S. were not limited 
to the many, many trips to Washington, and the many months spent 
there. After the pricing regulations were issued, we were then called on 
to help individual canners with the problems of computing prices, fill-
ing reports, preparing applications for relief, etc., etc. It was during 
these years that most of the canners in the United States came to know 
about or to hear about the Mayhew system, and this led to the estab-
lishment of industry cost accounting programs in the Northwest, the 
Midwest, New York State, and other areas, all patterned after the 
California industry. Some of the area groups for which we developed 
industry cost data during the periods turned out to be "war babies," 
such as the California dried fruit industry, and the Northwest fish 
canning industry. Most of these industry programs, however, have 
become permanent institutions; they are valuable both in peacetime 
and wartime. 
The wartime experiences with cost accounting and price con-
trols are important because in case of another national emergency it 
is certain that prices will be controlled again. There will be a new 
generation of bureaucrats, canners, and accountants. Some of the 
mistakes will be repeated, but it is to be hoped that these problems 
will be handled more efficiently and effectively because canning indus-
try unit cost finding is now widespread and industry cost programs 
have been established for most of the large segments of the industry. 
It is also to be hoped that the Government will be willing to recog-
nize public accountants as reliable and independent agents in develop-
ing the factual data that are so necessary in the writing of practical 
and equitable pricing regulations. Because of our continuing and ex-
panding experience in this field our firm should be able to render an 
extremely valuable service to both Government and industry. We 
shall certainly be able to do so if we continue to maintain our position 
as experts in this field. 
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Immediately after the Korean conflict our firm became very active 
in handling renegotiation cases for canners. All sales to Government 
agencies were subject to renegotiation of prices. The Renegotiation 
Agency established an office in San Francisco to handle all contracts 
with West Coast food processors. We soon became well acquainted 
with the personnel, which consisted of a group of very competent 
negotiators and accountants, including some experienced CPAs. The 
primary problem in each of these cases was to answer the question 
"What was a fair profit?" All of the profit in excess of this amount 
was claimed by the Government. In answering this question the 
agency recognized that the Government should not penalize canners 
for efficiency — if what appeared to be an excessive profit could be 
accounted for by low costs, then the amount normally claimed was 
very substantially reduced. The industry average costs that had been 
developed by us for all can sizes and grades were used as yardsticks 
of efficiency. In many instances we were able to prove beyond any 
reasonable doubt that a particular canner's high profits on items sold 
to the government were due to low costs. All of the settlements made 
for canners with this agency were eminently fair, and this was the ver-
dict of nearly all of the canners we represented. In terms of fees and 
in terms of the pleasure that comes from having satisfied clients, this 
phase of our wartime activities paid handsome dividends. 
Part II of this article will appear in the December Issue. 
Panelists at the Annual Credit Congress of the National Association of 
Credit Management included Michael A. C. Hume of our New York Office, 
John Lynch of Prentice-Hall, and W. L. Busch of Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc. 
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